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                                                                                    JNLRMI Vol. II Nr. 1 February 2003

 

                            Exit Epiphenomenalism: The Demolition of a Refuge

 

                                                            by Titus Rivas & Hein van Dongen*1

                [Note:  the original Spanish version of this article,  "Exit Epifenomenalismo: La demolición
             de un refugio", appeared in Revista de Filosofía, vol. 57 (2001).]

 

               

      

 

                     Abstract

                     This article examines the background, implications and merit of

                     the position of epiphenomenalism. Most of all, the authors

                     systematically present an analytical argument against

                     epiphenomenalism, the argument from the justification of the

                     assertion of the existence of consciousness. It is shown that

                     whereas epiphenomenalists claim to know that consciousness

                     exists, they implicitly deny the possibility of knowing

                     consciousness, since (according to their position) consciousness

                     cannot have any influence on our knowledge. Similarly, the authors

                     examine and reject the position of parallelism. Parallelism

                     implicitly states it knows of the existence of an unknowable

                     physical world. Consequences are mentioned for philosophy and

                     empirical science. 

 

                     Introduction

                     In this article we ask ourselves whether epiphenomenalism is a

                     tenable position. Epiphenomenalism is the thesis that the mind or

                     consciousness in the Cartesian sense of subjective experience

                     (which comprises both perception and thought, and emotion and

                     volition) is an epiphenomenon of the brain and therefore

                     completely impotent. Firstly we will briefly situate

                     epiphenomenalism within the philosophy of mind. Furthermore we

                     will offer a sketch of its significance for contemporary philosophy

                     and for empirical science. Then we will also give attention to the

                     arguments that have been presented in favor of the position. In

                     the second part we will look at the arguments that through the

                     passage of time have been used against epiphenomenalism. In

                     this part we will also present an argument that we believe

                     demonstrates better than any other its internal inconsistency.

                     Finally, in the third part, we will ask ourselves what consequences

                     the disqualification of epiphenomenalism (as a tenable position)

                     should have, both for the philosophy of mind and for philosophy in

                     general, as well as for the empirical sciences based on these. 

 

                     Epiphenomenalism 

                     Epiphenomenalism holds that all mental phenomena, processes or

                     conditions are nothing more than epiphenomena (by-products) of

                     cerebral processes. Hereby one does not intend to say that the

                     mental could not exist apart from the the physical (although this is

                     indeed implied by it), but that the mental does not have any

                     influence on reality. The subjective mind does exist, but it is not

                     "efficacious", i.e. it cannot be the cause of anything, neither within

                     its own mental dominion, nor within the physical world *2. For this

                     supposed mental incapacity people have created illustrative

                     images, like that of the steam whistle of a locomotive. The sound

                     of the steam whistle constitutes a real phenomenon, but it does

                     not influence the functioning of the loc, it is only an epiphenomenon

                     of it *3. In a similar way, there are conscious experiences that are

                     inevitably caused by cerebral processes. Just as the steam

                     whistle does not influence the functioning of the locomotive,

                     neither does consciousness influence the cerebral processes by

                     which it is produced. 

 

                     Ontology and causality

                     Epiphenomenalism is an answer to the question of the causal

                     influence of the mind or consciousness upon reality. The answer is

                     that the mind does not exercise any influence. The mind is always

                     only an effect and never a cause. As such, epiphenomenalism

                     may be classified within so called physicalism. Physicalism states

                     that everything that exists is the result of the laws which are valid

                     for the physical world. It is important to make a sharp distinction

                     between physicalism and materialism. Materialism is an

                     ontological position that states that the only thing that really exists

                     is matter -traditionally: "atoms in motion". Physicalism is not an

                     ontological position, but only speaks of the types of causality that

                     may exist. Also despite the possible existence of an uncountable

                     number of entities that never could be included in definitions of

                     matter, only the material entities can exercise a causal influence.

                     This leads to the conclusion that epiphenomenalism truly is

                     physicalist. However, it is not a reductionist materialist position because the

                     very reason that is given for the incapacity of consciousness

                     consists of the fact that consciousness is not material. Thus,

                     epiphenomenalism is a dualist physicalist position *4. There also

                     are other forms of physicalism, which do have a materialist

                     character. Thus, an identity theory cannot recognize either that the

                     subjective mind as such would be efficacious, because conscious

                     life following this thesis is in the objective sense identical to certain

                     physiological events in the brain, and therefore the subjective

                     properties don't matter causally in the objective sense. On the

                     other hand, the eliminationist positions naturally deny any influence

                     by the mind, for the simple reason that according to them the mind

                     does not even exist. Within the philosophy of mind,

                     epiphenomenalism is frequently used as though it were a synonym

                     of physicalism. For this reason the identity theory is frequently

                     called "epiphenomenalist" as well. This kind of confusion does not

                     facilitate the debate over epiphenomenalism. Some of the

                     arguments defended are either against or in favor of certain

                     other kinds of physicalism. It is for this reason that we stress

                     again that epiphenomenalism has a dualist ontology. It is this

                     ontology that following the physical principle leads to the

                     conclusion that there is indeed a mental life, but that that mental

                     life does not exert any influence upon reality. 

 

                     Dualism and psychogenic causality

                     Epiphenomenalism is one of the answers that dualists give to the

                     question of psychogenical causality: the influence of mind on

                     reality. It is the only completely physicalist answer within dualism.

                     There are also two other dualist positions concerning this

                     question. On the one hand we can find parallelism, that maintains

                     a partial physicalism. According to parallelism the mind does

                     exert causal influence upon its own mental reality, but not upon

                     physical reality. As in the case of physicalism, the material world

                     would be completely determined by physical laws. An important

                     difference, however, is that the material world does not influence

                     the mind either. There would be a complete parallel causality

                     between the two kinds of domain of reality. On the other hand

                     there is interactionism, which also rejects physicalism within the

                     material world. Following interactionism matter and mind both

                     exert a causal influence upon themselves and on each other. 

 

                     Implications of epiphenomenalism

                     In the philosophical sense, the major implication of

                     epiphenomenalism is that what we do or feel is never caused by

                     what we experience or have experienced. This implication goes

                     much further than the negation of free will. As subjective beings,

                     we are completely impotent confronted by the processes of the

                     material world. We cannot exert any influence upon them, but we

                     are completely determined by them. Our relations with reality, our

                     relation with ourselves, with other persons, with objects, etc., are

                     completely caused by physiological processes in the brain.

                     Such relations never initiate anything. Thus, epiphenomenalism

                     anthropologically implies an "imprisoned" consciousness that can

                     undertake absolutely nothing and never has any power over itself.

                     Naturally, this metaphysics has great consequences for the

                     axiology and ethics. In fact, axiologically epiphenomenalism

                     implies that all our values are biogenical; there are no values that

                     would not be epiphenomena of neurological processes.

                     Anything that we human beings experience as transcendent to the

                     purely biological, such as beauty, truth, or friendship, is in fact

                     nothing more than the impotent product of physiology which is

                     exempt of any value. This approaches a nihilist axiology. Why for

                     example do many people find a certain opus of Beethoven

                     moving?

                     Exclusively because their brains react in a specific way (causing

                     emotions) to a certain auditive structure and because that physical

                     reaction causes a certain positive subjective sensation, and never

                     because of the qualitative experience of beauty itself. In the field

                     of ethics not only do such concepts as responsibility lose their

                     meaning, but any ethical ideal should be seen as exclusively

                     caused by cerebral processes. The only kind of ethics that might

                     be reconciled with this, is a strictly descriptive naturalism. In other

                     words, the moral domain is completely determined by amoral

                     neurology.

                     In psychology, epiphenomenalism implies that everything which is

                     relevant for behaviour and cognition can in principle be completely

                     simulated by machines (computers). The same goes for animal

                     psychology and ethology: if human consciousness does not exert

                     any influence, then the same must naturally hold for animal

                     consciousness *5.

                     With regards to neuropsychology and psychiatry

                     epiphenomenalism agrees with the thought that they should be

                     completely determined by biology. In the case of psychiatric

                     disorders it is therefore always essential to emphasize physiology

                     (biopsychiatry).

                     Finally, parapsychology *6 which studies paranormal phenomena

                     which occur under experimental conditions, is hardly conceivable

                     given the presuppositions of epiphenomenalism. Various

                     parapsychologists consider their investigations as a possibility to

                     evaluate the hypothesis of direct interactions between mind and

                     physical reality, i.e.: investigations that aim at extrasensory

                     perception, and at psychokinesis, by which the mind would exert

                     influence outside its physical motor apparatus *7. 

 

                     Arguments in favor of epiphenomenalism 

                     To opt for the epiphenomenalist position is not an arbitrary choice.

                     In fact it consists, as has already been said, of a combination of

                     dualism and physicalism. With the dualist element,

                     epiphenomenalism avoids the objection against materialism that it

                     would deny the existence of consciousness which it itself would

                     need as a philosophical current, or which would reduce

                     consciousness to something material and therefore to something

                     unconscious *8.

 

                     For the remainder of this article, our attention will be directed

                     towards the physicalist aspect of epiphenomenalism, not to its

                     dualist ontology, which is shared by us *9. Therefore, this essay

                     will explicitly not deal with any form of materialism, because -just

                     like the epiphenomenalists and other dualists- we think it is evident

                     that there are aspects of the subjective mind which a priori cannot

                     be considered material in any way. In other words, the ontological

                     debate should therefore be taking place before the debate about

                     causal efficacy, not during, let alone afterwards. The mingling of

                     these two questions that clearly differ from each other has

                     already caused a lot of confusion. Although such may be very

                     unpopular, we won't follow then the materialist fashion and we will

                     only deal here with the problem of efficacy within a dualist context.

 

 

                     Epiphenomenalists present the following argumentation for their

                     physicalism: 1. From a theoretical point of view, it is more

                     parsimonious to adopt the physicalist position, because a) the

                     physical laws are as far as we know valid for all types of physical

                     organization, including the human organism and its brain *10. b)

                     there is not a single empirical bit of evidence for a psychogenic

                     effect on reality *11. 2. Interactionism is "inconceivable". It would

                     boil down to "magic", as Jackendoff puts it *12. How could

                     something mental cause something material? This second point

                     we will leave aside immediately. If we cannot conceive of a

                     psychogenic influence, then the somatogenic causation of the

                     psyche is even more inconceivable, and it is on such "magical"

                     causation that epiphenomenalism is explicitly based. We may add

                     that any causality is essentially mysterious *13. In what follows,

                     we will only consider acceptable the argument from parsimony.

                     The principle of parsimony is important within the philosophy of

                     science because it can lessen all kinds of unfounded speculations.

 

 

                     Arguments against epiphenomenalism 

                     After our exposition of epiphenomenalism, it is about time we

                     consider the counter-arguments. By the way, according to Hodges

                     and Lachs *14, philosophers have attacked epiphenomenalism

                     more often than that they have defended it. One can imagine their

                     motivation quite easily, if we look at the hardly attractive

                     implications of that position for all kinds of fields.

                     Within the counter-arguments presented we can distinguish

                     between four types: intuitive objections, arguments against the

                     parsimony of epiphenomenalism, an argument against the validity

                     of the position, and finally logical arguments directed against the

                     internal consistency (coherence) of epiphenomenalism.

 

                     First we will discuss the arguments presented that we know and

                     then we will present our own analytical argument. 

 

                     Intuitive objections 

                     The intuitive objections *15 against epiphenomenalism are

                     obvious. Epiphenomenalism does not harmonize at all with the

                     image an average person cherishes of him- or herself. For

                     common people it is evident that if they shout sometimes, it may

                     be because they feel angry, or that if they smile to someone, it is

                     because they feel sympathy towards that person, etc. *16

                     Epiphenomenalism goes against this intuitive concept of the

                     existence of psychogenical causality. It would 'debunk' it, as it

                     were, in the following sense: "People may believe that their

                     conscious experiences matter causally, but they're just wrong, it

                     only appears to be so. In fact, only cerebral processes and

                     structures can have a causal impact on reality" *17. The intuitive

                     argument that our daily speech would show innumerable examples

                     of the importance of consciousness, is, of course, equally weak;

                     in other words, language reflects such ideas as are conceived of

                     by (common) people, and those ideas can, as has already been

                     said, be completely erroneous. We do share the intuitive

                     objections mentioned, but we are aware that in debates

                     concerning epiphenomenalism they are not of much weight. 

 

                     Arguments regarding parsimony 

                     Among the arguments regarding parsimony one can make a

                     subdivision between arguments that go against the

                     epiphenomenalist's argument 1(a) and an argument against 1(b),

                     both mentioned above. That is, against the universality of the laws

                     of physics, and against the lack of empirical evidence for

                     psychogenical causality.

 

                     Arguments against the universality of the laws of physics:

 

                     Argument based on evolution theory

 

                     The evolutionary argument was already entertained by William

                     James *18 and recently it has been defended once more by Karl

                     Popper *19. According to William James, the properties of

                     consciousness indicate its causal efficacy. First of all

                     consciousness probably becomes more complex and intense in

                     the course of animal evolution. In this sense it is similar to a

                     physical organ. Secondly, consciousness would be a kind of

                     "selective agency", an instrument to make decisions with. Thirdly,

                     the nervous systems which get more complex at every stage of

                     evolution, do not only seem to adapt better every time, and to get

                     more flexible each time, but also they seem to get more unstable

                     with every evolutionary step.

                     It is for this reason, that consciousness would have originated,

                     following James, as it makes choices, and thus prevents the brain

                     from being lost in chaos. This is due among other reasons to the

                     fact that only consciousness has something to choose, 'matters

                     has no ideals to pursue'. Thus consciousness raises the

                     probability of the maintenance of biological life. On this point,

                     James reasons as follows: This plausible image offers a

                     justification of the existence of consciousness. If consciousness

                     does not matter, why would it ever have originated during

                     evolution? Karl Popper formulates it as follows: 'If natural

                     selection is to account for the emergence of the World 2 of

                     subjective or mental experiences, the theory must explain the

                     manner in which the evolution of World 2 (and of World 3)

                     systematically provides us with instruments for survival" *20.

                     Now, the problem with the evolutionary argument is that its

                     proponents don't realize enough that not all individual parts of an

                     organism need to be functional from the point of view of evolution

                     theory *21. A bear may for example have a thick and warm skin

                     which is also very heavy. The warmth of the skin contributes to

                     the bear's survival, but the weight does not. The weight is an

                     inevitable epiphenomenon of the fact that the skin is thick and

                     warm. Thus it is well conceivable that something inevitably

                     originates as a consequence of a certain organization of genes

                     without it having any importance for evolution itself. Therefore, it is

                     incorrect to sustain that epiphenomenalism would inevitably

                     contradict (neo)darwinism. It is not necessary for consciousness

                     to have a positive effect in order to be conserved as a possible

                     effect of evolution, but exclusively that it would not affect the

                     probability of survival and reproduction in a negative way. This is

                     precisely what is the case according to epiphenomenalism:

                     Consciousness does not have any impact on anything, neither

                     positive nor negative. With regards to James's argument *22 of

                     the "selective agent" that consciousness would be: this is explicitly

                     attacked by Ray Jackendoff. In reality, Jackendoff holds, it is a

                     subconscious, 'computational' process of concentration and

                     selection of certain information, that would in many cases

                     effectively lead to experiences of conscious attention. The real

                     selection and choice would thus take place at a subconscious

                     level, not based on subconscious objectives and motives, but on

                     its hypothetical subconscious "substrates" (= the hypothetical

                     physiological structures underlying them).

 

                     Implication of teleology

                     Another argument supplied by William James, states that in cases

                     of cerebral lesions certain functions can be suppressed and that

                     afterwards they apparently can be transferred to other parts of

                     the brain, which might indicate an efficacy that only can be related

                     to consciousness. The problem with this argument is that it might

                     be the case in fact that it should be explained by a kind of

                     pre-wiring of the brain that would allow several parts to adopt

                     several programs. There is no reason why it should be

                     consciousness that would cause the transfer of functions, but it

                     could be just the interactions between the demands that life

                     imposes on the organism and the physiological possibilities of

                     which it still disposes. The supposed teleology might in theory be

                     just apparent.

 

                     Argument against the lack of empirical evidence for psychogenic

                     causality:

 

                     Parapsychological data 

                     John Beloff *23 is the main opponent of epiphenomenalism who

                     founds his case on paranormal or PSI phenomena, viz.

                     extrasensory perception (ESP) and psychokinesis (PK). Beloff

                     believes that only PSI phenomena can demonstrate the efficacy of

                     the mind. He explicitly rejects all the other types of argumentation.

                     This attitude can be compared to that of Ray Jackendoff who

                     holds that he could only be convinced by empirical data that his

                     position is incorrect. Jackendoff does not say, however, what kind

                     of phenomena these data would entail *24.

 

                     Since in his view only PSI phenomena might refute

                     epiphenomenalism, Beloff considers parapsychology as one of the

                     most important means of regaining our dignity and awareness of

                     our human worth. He holds also that there are valid reasons to

                     suppose that PSI phenomena really do exist. Furthermore, he

                     states that PSI phenomena can be explained most easily by forms

                     of psychogenic causality. Not only there is no evidence

                     whatsoever that the brain might have completely unknown powers

                     that might result in PSI phenomena. But also, he is convinced that

                     PSI phenomena would show the same intentional activities as the

                     ones studied by common psychology. Although it is conceivable

                     that PSI phenomena are caused by something completely

                     different from both mind and brain *25, this is not at all a plausible

                     hypothesis.

 

                     Alfred Ayer *26 states that epiphenomenalism is defined in such a

                     way that it would never be possible to refute it. In our opinion,

                     however, PSI phenomena might be considered as phenomena,

                     the physicalist explanation of which approaches zero to such

                     degree, that the pretension of parsimony loses its power *27.

                     Also, we think that parapsychology has sufficiently demonstrated

                     that the existence of PSI is plausible. When philosophers such as

                     William James *28, Gerard Heymans*29, Henri Bergson *30, and

                     H.H. Price *31 included these phenomena in their philosophy of

                     mind, the data were still more controversial than they are today.

                     In the meantime, the evidence for the incidence of these

                     phenomena is of such quality that some publications about them

                     are accepted by journals of science *32 and also for example by

                     the eminent American Association for the Advancement of

                     Science.

                     Some renowned physicists seem to be inclined not to reduce the

                     phenomena to autonomous physical processes, and they even

                     include them within models that show interactionist properties *33.

                     It might be emotionally difficult to seriously accept the existence of

                     PSI phenomena, but at the end of the twentieth century this

                     should not be an obstacle anymore to the right assessment of the

                     abundant evidence in this field. 

 

                     Argument against the validity of epiphenomenalism 

                     This argument was also presented by Karl Popper *34. He holds

                     that if a reasoning is really only realized on a physiological level,

                     the epiphenomenalist cannot maintain the validity of his or her own

                     position. The possible validity of epiphenomenalism is not a

                     physical property but should be seen as a positive judgment on

                     the position based on abstract principles. Popper does not

                     consider this point as a refutation of epiphenomenalism, but he

                     does conclude that the epiphenomenalist cannot use any

                     argument to defend him- or herself, as that would imply the

                     recognition of the impact of immaterial principles. We agree with

                     this argument of Popper. If the epiphenomenalist states that in the

                     real world the only things that matter are physical entities, why

                     does (s)he bother then about such things as "truth" and "validity"?

 

                     Arguments against the internal consistency of epiphenomenalism

                     Several arguments have been formulated according to which

                     epiphenomenalism contradicts itself. All of these arguments are

                     structured as follows:

 

                     Epiphenomenalism does itself mention consciousness, while

                     denying for example its efficacy. This implies that consciousness

                     in one way or another has had an effect upon epiphenomenalism's

                     argumentation and upon the ideas on which it is based.

 

                     The argument from the knowledge of contents of consciousness

                     The crudest form of the argument mentioned above states the

                     following: Some epiphenomenalists are talking about all kinds of

                     contents of consciousness, such as for example the experience of

                     colours or sounds, and they hold at the same time that none of

                     these contents would have any impact on reality. How is it

                     possible then that those very same epiphenomenalists talk about

                     contents of consciousness?

                     This version of the argument, however, can still be refuted by

                     epiphenomenalism. While talking about the contents of

                     consciousness, one does not have to be talking, according to

                     epiphenomenalism, about the contents themselves, but in fact only

                     about the specific physiological substrates that constitute the

                     supposed cause of any kind of subjective experiences *35. A

                     proposition such as 'I see the color red' would thus be caused

                     completely by the supposed physiological correlate of the content

                     of the consciousness concerned. That there would be such

                     physiological substrates for any conscious content that exists, is a

                     basic principle of epiphenomenalism: All subjective experiences

                     would be caused by cerebral structures or processes *36.

 

                     The argument from the origin of the concept of consciousness

                     Where did our concepts regarding subjective experiences come

                     from? This is the question which is raised by the second version of

                     the logical argument. S. Shoemaker holds that it is qualia which

                     are the cause of the existence of a belief in the existence of

                     qualia. Following Shoemaker *37, one could maintain that people

                     would think, talk and write about the concept of consciousness

                     because they have formed this concept on the basis of

                     consciousness.

                     Thus formulated, the argument is still not strong enough *38. First,

                     according to the epiphenomenalists one could still well imagine a

                     conceptual representation of consciousness within a system that

                     does not possess any consciousness itself, but only an innate

                     concept of consciousness. Secondly, talking about consciousness

                     does not in itself prove anything regarding the presence of such

                     consciousness, because one could also program a computer in

                     such a way that it would produce verbal output about the concept

                     of consciousness.

 

                     The argument from wondering about consciousness

                     Elitzur *39 states that consciousness does not have to be the

                     cause of a concept of consciousness, but it does have to be the

                     cause of the fact that "people are bothered by problems of

                     consciousness". However, if it is possible that there is an innate

                     concept of consciousness, which is not excluded by Elitzur, then

                     the emotional interest concerning the strange concept of

                     consciousness could be explained away as a subjective

                     epiphenomenon of a purely physiological phenomenon.

                     Physiological substrates of wondering about the supposedly

                     innate concept of consciousness would lead to an experience of

                     wonder and interest.

 

                     The argument from the justification of the concept of

                     consciousness

                     We ourselves know three authors that completely independently

                     from us have reached the following version of the logical argument

                     against epiphenomenalism, they are: Michael Watkins, Dennett*40

                     and John Foster*41.

                     Reacting to an essay by Jackson of 1982 *42, Michael Watkins

                     wrote a short article in the journal 'Analysis' *43. Jackson had

                     defended in his essay the existence of epiphenomenal qualia

                     which are completely impotent, i.e. qualitative aspects of

                     subjective experience. To this Watkins reacted in the following

                     way: 'Beliefs about qualia cannot be justified on the basis of

                     qualitative experiences since those experiences do not cause

                     those beliefs. The only evidence we have of qualia is our direct

                     experience of them.' Daniel C. Dennett published in 1991 his

                     'Consciousness explained' after the formulation by Watkins and

                     also after a first formulation of this argument by one of us *44.

                     Although starting from a different philosophy of mind,

                     functionalism, he shows in a similar way that epiphenomenalism is

                     incoherent or internally inconsistent, and that for that reason it

                     does not deserve any serious philosophical attention *45. On page

                     403 he says literally: : 'So if anyone claims to uphold a variety of

                     epiphenomenalism, try to be polite, but ask: What are you talking

                     about', and on page 405 he concludes: 'There could not be an

                     empirical reason, then for believing in epiphenomena. Could there

                     be another sort of reason for asserting their existence? What sort

                     of reason? An a priori reason, presumably. But what? No one has

                     ever offered one -good, bad, or indifferent- that I have seen.'

                     According to Stokes (1991) John Foster has stated in a

                     discussion of the subject that if epiphenomenalism is valid,

                     anything said by its proponents about mental events would lose its

                     meaning as there could be no impact of such events on their own

                     thought and words. In other words, the supposed validity of

                     epiphenomenalism is self-defeating.

 

                     These philosophers have exactly hit the point in our opinion. In

                     order to clarify this, we will present our own independent

                     formulation:

 

                     (1) Epiphenomenalism uses the concept of consciousness, as it

                     states that there is such a thing as consciousness, which has got

                     properties that are not material, etc.

                     (2) Epiphenomenalism thus holds that its concept of

                     consciousness refers to a real part of reality, namely to the

                     (presumably) epiphenomenal but irreducible world of mental

                     experience.

                     (3) We have to be aware that even if the concept of

                     consciousness had been innate, the reality to which it refers

                     -consciousness- could only be established through introspection,

                     i.a. by establishing that there are such things as conscious

                     experiences. Epiphenomenalism starts from the reality of

                     consciousness and it is based on the (introspective) evidence for

                     the existence of conscious experiences.

                     There may be an innate concept of consciousness or not, in any

                     case epiphenomenalism uses subjective experiences as a touch

                     stone for such a concept. After all, it is absurd to think that the

                     reality of something might be established on the basis that we

                     have a concept of that entity (take for example the case of the

                     unicorn). The only valid reason for supposing there really are

                     conscious experiences is therefore the introspective observation

                     that there are such experiences. If nobody would introspectively

                     observe subjective experiences, there would be no reason to

                     suppose that there really would be such a thing as consciousness.

 

                     Epiphenomenalism is forced therefore to found its unconditional

                     acceptance on an introspective contact with that very same

                     consciousness. Such a contact, however, equals a causal effect

                     by consciousness upon the conceptualization processes of the

                     one that contemplates his or her subjective experiences through

                     introspection.

                     By the way, it is not necessary to conceive of the impact of

                     consciousness in this process as a conscious 'act'. It suffices to

                     conceive it as a 'factor', comparable to the causal status of an

                     object perceived during the process of perception *46. In this

                     respect, we might rephrase Berkeley by saying: 'percipi est

                     movere' (to be perceived is to move). This view clearly contrasts

                     with that of David Chalmers (1996) who seems to believe a real

                     entity can make a difference for our knowledge without at the

                     same time exerting a causal influence. Chalmers seems to

                     overlook the fact that in order to have a realistic concept of

                     something that entity must be somehow represented in memory

                     (be it mental or neural) which means that the non-causal influence

                     on knowledge postulated by him must in the end have a really

                     causal effect after all. Anthony J. Rudd has successfully defended 
                     Foster's formulation of the analytical argument against Chalmers' 
                     critique (Rudd, 2000). 
 

                    

                    (4) Thus epiphenomenalism internally contradicts 
                     itself. It states  that there would be a valid reason to postulate mental

                     experiences, but proclaims at the same time that these

                     experiences are completely unknowable, by denying them any

                     causal impact *47. The inevitable conclusion therefore is that

                     epiphenomenalism should be disqualified for good.

 

                     A possible defense by the epiphenomenalists would be at first

                     sight that in this analytical argument we would encounter a

                     dubious kind of 'justificationism', as not all theoretical entities must

                     be justified directly by observations. Is it not enough that the

                     entities would make a difference for the predictions that follow

                     from the hypothesis? Perhaps this defense may seem to set the

                     epiphenomenalist free from the need of founding his or her

                     certainty that there really is such a thing as subjective awareness.

                     However, the contrary is true. Even if we would take the case

                     mentioned seriously, this would still lead us to the conclusion that

                     consciousness needs to make an impact, even if only indirectly, on

                     the predictions about reality, and that influence would not be

                     reconcilable with epiphenomenalism either *48.

 

                     Epiphenomenalism turns out to be a kind of obscurantism, an

                     erroneous representation of (part of) reality in favour of

                     conceptions that are considered indubitable, i.e. of physicalism

                     *49, and of the irreducibility of the subjective mind. We might say

                     that it is a 'refuge' for those physicalists who are not blind to their

                     own subjectivity *50. The argument described above shows

                     clearly that physicalism can no longer believe that it is safe from

                     radical dualistic attacks.

 

                     Implications of the disqualification of epiphenomenalism

                     The disqualification of epiphenomenalism is, as we have just seen,

                     inevitable. Now, we will give attention to the consequences of the

                     disqualification of epiphenomenalism. Ray Jackendoff stated in

                     1989, confronted by our version of the argument from the

                     justification of the concept of consciousness, that it might be wise

                     to reconsider the reality of subjective experiences. Dennett has

                     even a more extreme position. Starting from his own formulation

                     of our analytical argument, he concludes that no one is conscious,

                     at least not in the common, 'mysterious' and qualitative sense of

                     the term *51. Both authors conclude in other words from the

                     irreconcilability of physicalism and dualism that the concept of

                     consciousness should be eliminated, i.e. sacrificed to the

                     protection of indubitable physicalism *52. In fact we might qualify

                     this as a contemporaneous form of blind and unfounded

                     dogmatism.

                     On the other hand, it is interesting to note that both thinkers do

                     not opt anymore for the materialist identity theory, but directly for

                     reductionist materialism, which denies the existence of the

                     subjective mind. This is so, because the identity theory also holds

                     that only the so called 'objective' side to the subjective mind, i.e.

                     the brain (or part of it), would have an objective impact on reality.

                     However, this is impossible, as we have already seen, because

                     for the justification of postulating a subjective mind, it is necessary

                     to believe that subjective mind is efficacious qua subjective mind,

                     and not only in the so called 'objective', physiological sense, as

                     identity theory would have it.

                     Therefore, as we are not going to imitate the opportunistic denial

                     of consciousness, we will have to look for another variant with

                     regards to psychogenical causality within dualism, unless we

                     would go for idealism, which is a conception we will not discuss in

                     this paper.

 

                     The disqualification of parallellism

                     Various authors *53 stress that parallellism and epiphenomenalism

                     have a lot in common. Both positions state that for each and every

                     subjective experience there is a physiological correlate. The

                     difference is, however, that this correlate according to

                     epiphenomenalism is the substrate of that experience, whereas

                     according to parallellism it would only involve a parallel correlate.

                     Now, parallellism should be disqualified for a similar reason as the

                     one given against epiphenomenalism, it even is the mirror image

                     of our analytical argument. Epiphenomenalism cannot reconcile its

                     certainty that there really is such a thing as a conscious mind with

                     the implied impossibility of knowing the existence of

                     consciousness. Parallellism, on the other hand, cannot reconcile

                     its certainty that there really is a material world with the purported

                     inability of that world to have an impact on the psyche. In other

                     words, on the one hand, there would be no doubt according to

                     parallellism that there is a physical world, but on the other hand it

                     follows from the supposed parallel and strictly separate causality

                     that the physical world cannot have any influence upon the

                     psyche. Thus there is once again a contradiction: We know with

                     certainty of the existence of physical world, while at the same

                     time we are certainly incapable of knowing that same physical

                     world.

                     Therefore only interactionism is left as the sole possibility *54.

                     This implies that the acceptance of the existence of irreducible

                     subjective experiences (apart from the existence of a material

                     world), or dualism, logically leads to interactionism.

 

                     Interactionism

                     As it seems, intuition was right. We certainly do count as subjetive

                     beings, we doubtlessly have an impact upon ourselves, upon our

                     lives and upon our social and physical environment.

                     Also, axiology and ethics cannot be reduced to biogenical

                     epiphenomena. In (human) psychology and in ethology and animal

                     psychology *55, it should from now on be clear that

                     consciousness is important for experience and behaviour.

                     Apparently, it is at least a source of conceptualization. Any current

                     or theory within these sciences that would be fundamentally

                     irreconciliable with the existence of psychogenic causality, should

                     be made aware of the untenability of the positions of

                     epiphenomenalism and parallellism. We are not, to paraphrase

                     Huxley, 'conscious automata'.

                     Furthermore, in neuropsychology and psychiatry the point of

                     departure should be that there really are effects of consciousness

                     upon processes in the brain. Cerebral processes are therefore not

                     the only internal causes of behaviour and experience, but so is

                     subjective awareness.

                     A psychiatry that wants to be beneficial cannot limit itself

                     therefore to a purely physiological treatment.

                     Finally, the scientific theoretical status of parapsychology (which

                     almost by definition contrasts with physicalism) is no longer an

                     apriori problem within the framework of interactionism. 

 

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                   The authors of 'Exit Epiphenomenalism: The demolition of

                                                          a refuge' 

                     Titus Rivas, MA (psych. & phil.) (1964) is a graduate of

                     systematical philosophy and theoretical psychology. His main

                     fields of theoretical interest include, in alphabetical order: animal

                     psychology and ethics, axiology, general psychology, metaphysics

                     and parapsychology. He has published articles about various

                     topics within these and other domains and a book on

                     parapsychological reincarnation research, "Parapsychologisch

                     onderzoek naar reïncarnatie en leven na de dood".

                     Hein van Dongen PhD (phil.) (1957) has been a student of Dutch

                     litterature and graduated in philosophy at the University of

                     Amsterdam. One of his responsibilities is that of editor of the

                     Dutch journal Prana. He has recently published a book, written

                     together with Hans Gerding titled 'Het voertuig van de ziel', about

                     the hylic pluralism of the Dutch philosopher J.J.Poortman.

 

                     Correspondence should go to: Titus Rivas, Darrenhof 9, 6533 RT

                     Nijmegen, The Netherlands

 

                     An earlier Spanish version of this paper was published as "Exit

                     Epifenomenalismo: La demolición de un refugio" in Revista de

                     Filosofia (Universidad de Santiago, Chile), 2001, vol. LVII,

                     111-129.

                     The content of the Spanish paper is practically identical to this

                     English version, the main exception consisting of our present

                     remarks about the position defended by David Chalmers.

 

                     Notes

 

                     1. Our thanks go to Rob de Vries, John Beloff, Ray Jackendoff,

                     Michael Watkins, Anthony J. Rudd and David Chalmers for their advice and

                     correspondence. Furthermore we are especially grateful to René

                     van Delft, Dick Bierman, Bob van Dorp, Eric de Maeyer and

                     Esteban Rivas for comments. Finally we are indebted to Peter

                     N.J. Diederen Jr. for having put at our disposal his large library.

                     We also wish to thank Editors Dr. and Dr. Carla Cordua 
                     for their efforts in making the publication of this English version possible.
 

 

                     2. Eccles, 1977, pp. 17-18.

 

                     3. Huxley, 1898, pp. 31-38; James, 1891, p. 129. James also

                     mentions as other images: foam, aura, or melody. A

                     contemporary symbol is the small light or buzzing noise in

                     computers which indicates that they are working, but which does

                     not exert any influence upon its functioning. An additional symbol is

                     that of a shadow.

 

                     4.Beloff, 1987, p. 215; Bergson, 1944, p. 40; Hodges & Lachs,

                     1979, p. 515. Some epiphenomenalists speak of 'non-reductive physicalism',
                      but it is clear that the reason for their epiphenomenalism is that they endorse 
                      a (property-) dualist view of consciousness

 

                     5. See for example: Van Rooijen, 1985, pp. 379-383.

 

                     6. We refer here to parapsychology as the empirical study of

                     anomalies, in which the possible existene of those anomalous is

                     not a priori denied and in which the investigation is focussed at the

                     study of their reality. In other words, we are not talking about the

                     sociological or psychological study of 'paranormal' experiences

                     which is based on the hypothesis that the phenomena are not (or

                     cannot be) real.

 

                     7. Bierman, Van Dongen & Gerding, 1991.

 

                     8. Beloff, 1988, p. 217.

 

                     9. We hope it is clear that apart from eliminationism we also

                     discard the various types of identity theory, functionalism and

                     emergence materialism. In practice all of these positions can from

                     an ontological point of view be seen here as forms of materialism,

                     as all of them hold that the mind does not constitute a separate

                     domain of reality, but that it can be seen -and this sense be

                     reduced to- an "interior side", "pattern" or "level" of matter.

                     However, matter can by definition never be subjective, neither in a

                     special manifestation of it nor as some kind of mysterious level. As

                     Karl Popper has shown (p. 81, etc.) the negation of this fact leads

                     to a pseudo-materialism which really is a kind of idealism, or to a

                     definitory confusion (a form of obscurantism) in which the term

                     "matter" comes something like "reality" so that it cannot fulfill a

                     distinctive function in the debate any longer.

 

                     10. For example according to Leibniz, see Stokes, 1993, p. 45.

                     11. Jackendoff, 1988, personal communication. Compare this

                     with: Heymans, 1933, pp. 85, etc.

 

                     12. Jackendoff, 1987, pp. 311-317.

 

                     13. James, 1891, pp. 136-137; compare: Crane and Mellor,

                     1990, p. 192. One of the best passages about this question can

                     be found in Bolzano, 1970, pp. 86-87 (in our own free translation):

                     " However, we have to presuppose the existence of immediate

                     influences [in nature]... Because if we do not absolutely deny all

                     mutual influences, if we do not want to maintain, against common

                     sense, that in the whole of creation there would not be a

                     necessary coherence between entities anywhere, if at least we do

                     no want to do that, then we must admit there also exists some

                     kind of immediate influence.

                     Because if such a thing would not exist, how could there be any

                     indirect influence? However, immediate influences whether they

                     occur between [ontological] substances that are individual or

                     between complex objects or between, on the one hand individual

                     simple entities and on the other hand complex entities,

                     presuppose in all these cases something incomprehensible."

 

                     14. His source for this is "Shorter Oxford English Dictionary".

 

                     15. Compare: Roger Penrose, 1989, 527.

 

                     16. J. Shaffer, 1965, 100-101.

 

                     17. William James, 1891, 138-144.

 

                     18. Karl Popper (with Eccles), 1977.

 

                     19. Karl Popper, 72, etc.

 

                     20. Compare this also with Roger Penrose, 1989, 528.

 

                     21. René Marres, 1985, 161-162. We also refer to the more

                     recent English translation of the book by Marres from 1989, In

                     defense of mentalism: A critical review of the philosophy of mind.

 

                     22. Ray Jackendoff, 280-283.

 

                     23. John Beloff, 1987, 218-225.

 

                     24. Personal communication.

 

                     25. Beloff, 1987, 220. Even if there had emerged completely new

                     and still unknown physical principles of the organization of the

                     brain, we would not expect those hypothetical principles to go

                     against the physical limitations of that same brain as an organical

                     (physical) system.

 

                     26. Ayer, 1986, 221.

 

                     27. Compare: Ian Stevenson, 1987, 228. One might in theory still

                     imagine spontaneous correlations between physical events and

                     mental states, which could still be reconciled with

                     epiphenomenalism.

 

                     28. William James, 1986.

 

                     29. G. Heymans, G., 1925.

 

                     30. Henri Bergson, 1944.

 

                     31. H.H. Price, 1940, 363-385.

 

                     32. D. Radin, & R. Nelson , 1989, 1499-1541 and also

                     'Onverklaarbare relaties tussen het bewustzijn en

                     toevalsprocessen'. Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie (1989). See:

                     Bierman, Gerding y Van Dongen.

 

                     33. Bierman, Van Dongen and Gerding, 1992; this book contains

                     contributions by Brian Josephson and Olivier Costa de

                     Beauregard, among other scholars.

 

                     34. Karl Popper, 81.

 

                     35. Rob de Vries, 1991, 10, 2, 75-76.

 

                     36. For a more extensive refutation of this version, see: M.

                     Hodges en J. Lachs, 1979, 32, 515-529.

 

                     37. S. Shoemaker, 1975, 27, 29, etc.

 

                     38. A.C. Elitzur, 1989, 10, 9-10.

 

                     39. A.C. Elitzur, 9; Compare: Roger Penrose , 1987, 16; Penrose,

                     1989, 528.

 

                     40. Daniel C. Dennett in his already mentioned Consciousness

                     Explained of 1991.

 

                     41. In fact, the Dutch philosopher René Marres also mentions in

                     passing the argument of the justification of the concept of

                     consciousness. However, he speaks of a paradox rather than a

                     contradiction as he states on page 183 of the book mentioned

                     before: "Therefore, an epiphenomenalist cannot hold that his belief

                     in the existence of mental processes is based on that same

                     existence." Unfortunately, Marres has clearly underestimated the

                     value of this argument.

 

                     42. F. Jackson, 1982.

 

                     43. Michael Watkins, 1989.

 

                     44. See the paragraph 'Filosofische kritiek op het fysicalisme' in

                     the article by Titus Rivas (1990, pp. 10-11) or his more recent

                     article (1999).

 

                     45. D.C. Dennett, 402-405.

 

                     46. The very phenomenon of introspection is in itself necessarily

                     an act of a conscious subject.

 

                     47. There still is another way to demonstrate the logical structure

                     of the internal inconsistency of epiphenomenalism. Let's suppose

                     a proposition A which reads: We know of the existence of

                     subjective experiences (or 'consciousness'). Another proposition B

                     reads: We cannot know of the existence of subjective

                     experiences.

                     Proposition B implies a proposition C, which reads: We do not

                     know of the existence of subjective experiences. If we substitute

                     "we know of the existence of subjective experiences" for a symbol

                     D, epiphenomenalism can be represented as follows: it holds D

                     and not-D at the same time, which clearly constitutes a

                     contradiction.

 

                     48. Compare this with Dennett, 1991, 402.

 

                     49. The enormous influence that physicalism has on the so called

                     "hard" natural sciences, can be seen for example in the following

                     statement of the famous cosmologist Stephen Hawking: 'We

                     already know the natural laws that govern everything that we

                     experience in our daily lives."

 

                     50. Compare this with Churchland, 1990, 12: "It's a compromise

                     between the wish to do justice to a strictly scientific approach to

                     the explanation of behavior, and the wish to do justice to the

                     testimony of introspection."

 

                     51. Dennett in his 'Brainstorms' of 1979 speaks of "mythical"

                     where he mentions qualia.

 

                     52. In fact, the existence of personal consciousness, of our

                     subjective inner life, is the only thing that can never be doubted.

                     Compare: from a logical, analytical point of view it is possible to

                     doubt that there is a material world (which ultimately may lead to

                     idealism) or that there are other minds (the ultimate consequence

                     of which might be solipsism), but it is irrational to doubt that my

                     own (irreducible) inner of world of subjective and qualitative

                     experiences is real.

 

                     53. For example: Karl Popper, 72.

 

                     54. We won't consider here exactly what interactionist

                     (sub)theories are superior.

 

                     55. The presence of consciousness among animals is probable on

                     the basis of the so called analogy postulate. See: Esteban and

                     Titus Rivas, 1991.

 

 

For a follow-up on this argument and reactions to it see  "Why the efficacy of consciousness cannot be limited to the mind, by Titus Rivas at